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I. Background
One of the little known aspects of the Vietnam War has been the South
Vietnamese program to win the allegiance of former enemy sympathizers.
Over the last eight years thousands of prisoners of war and defectors have
become productive South Vietnamese citizens through the Chieu Hoi
program. This article will examine the history, philosophy and practical
workings of the program. Particular emphasis will be given to the operation
of the Chieu Hoi program in areas involving the Geneva Conventions on
the humane treatment of prisoners.
No treatment of the Chieu Hoi program under rules of international law
relating to prisoners of war, repatriation and defection would be complete
without examining pertinent portions of the Geneva Convention. The lot of
the early prisoner of war (PW) was indeed unenviable. But a prisoner who
was once subject to every caprice of his captor now fortunately has for his
protection a statute of 143 articles which was concluded under the auspices
of the International Red Cross at Geneva on 12 August 1949
Three other conventions resulted from this humanitarian effort to control
the treatment of war victims by treaties. 2 The Conventions provide for the
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11949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949,
6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (effective 25 Feb. 1956 [hereafter referred to and
cited as Convention or Geneva Convention]. U.S. DEP'T. OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 20-15 1,
LECTURES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 1 (1958).
2(a) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protecting of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (effective 2 Feb. 1956); (b)
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maximum of humane and civilized treatment that can be conceived in war
conditions. Within these articles are found specific descriptions of the
treatment to which each prisoner is entitled. The United States and the
competing governments of North and South Vietnam are each party to the
four Conventions.
A terse doctrinal analysis of the 1949 Geneva Convention and a look at
U.S. policy in South Vietnam regarding PW's is necessary for an exam-
ination of the specific situations which arise under the Chieu Hoi program.
The general rule or humane treatment is contained in Article 13 of the
Convention: "Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely
treated ... prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly
against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public
curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited." 3
Article 14 states: "Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to
respect for their persons and their honor .... ,,4 The captor is required to
provide for the maintenance and medical care of its prisoners.5 The
treatment is to be equal among prisoners.6 Conditions under which prison-
ers are quartered must be as favorable as those of the captor's own forces. 7
In addition provision has to be made for food,8 clothing, 9 and medical
attention. 10 The Convention encourages intellectual activity for prisoners
of war."
II. U.S. Procedure Regarding PW's
Current United States policy in Vietnam calls for prisoners of war (PW)
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 (effective 2
Feb. 1956); and (c) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 (effective 2 Feb. 1956) [hereafter referred to collectively as
Geneva Conventions of 1949]. For the manner in which the 1949 Conventions were drafted




61d. Art. 16. For a thorough discussion of the entitlement of deserters and defectors to
prisoner of war status see Esgain and Solf, The 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War: Its Principles, Innovations and Deficiencies, 41 N. C. L.
REV. 537, 554-64 (1963). For a history of PW utilization by the U.S. Army see U.S. DEP'T
OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 20-213, HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE
UNITED STATES ARMY [1955].71d. Art. 25.
81d. Art. 26.
9 1d. Art. 27.
'lid. Arts. 29-32.1
'id. Art. 38.
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to be delivered, after interrogation, to South Vietnamese forces.12 Since
South Vietnam is a party to the Geneva Convention there is no violation of
our duty in this respect. Article 12 of the Convention specifically autho-
rizes the transfer of prisoners to the custody of another country which is a
party to the Convention if the releasing country knows that the receiving
country is able to comply with the Convention. 13
In implementing this policy of turning prisoners over to the Vietnamese
authorities the United States Military Assistance Command (MACV) has
stated that it realizes a continuing responsibility for the prisoners captured
by its forces under Article 12, and that even after classification and in-
terrogation of a person he "will be retained in U.S. channels until released
to an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) PW Camp...."14
Prior to any transfer, the capturing force must designate the person
captured as a prisoner of war.' 5 The first determination of status is made
by the interrogating officer following the initial interrogation.' 6 According
to the current interpretation, the following are entitled to status as prison-
ers of war: (1) members of the People's Army of Vietnam captured in
combat; (2) members of the Viet Cong if they meet the criteria set forth in
Article 4(a)(2) of the Convention (i.e., if they are subject to a commander,
carry arms openly, wear a uniform or other distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance, and comply with the laws and customs of war), or if they
indicate, and it is established, that they come under some other provision
of Article 4; and (3) members of the Viet Cong main force under Article
4(a)(1) (i.e., members of the regular armed forces of a party to the
'
2 Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 381-46, para. 5,
Annex A (27 Dec. 1967) [hereafter cited as MACV Dir. 381-46], and Headquarters, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 190-3, para. 5 (12 Feb. 1968) [hereafter cited as
MACV Dir. 190-3]. For a discussion of the modern attitude towards prisoners of war with
numerous authorities cited therein see Prugh, The Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 678, 682 (1956).13A few Communist nations have made reservations to Article 12, typical of which is the
Soviet Union's, specifically stating they do "not consider as valid the freeing of a detaining
power, which has transferred prisoners of war to another power, from responsibility for the
application of the Convention to such prisoners of war while the latter are in the custody of
the power accepting them."
14 MACV Dir. 190-3, para. 2b. In accord MACV Dir. 381-46, para. 5, Annex A;




5MACV Dir. 381-46 para. 4, and Annex A. Army Field Manual 27-10, at 25, includes
the definitions of Article 4 of the Convention and lists the criteria to be used for determining
persons entitled to treatment as prisoners of war by American troops.
WHeadquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Directive 20-5, para. 6d (15
Mar. 1968) [hereafter cited as MACV Dir. 20-5]. For a discussion of prisoner status see
Note. The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict, 5 V.J. INT'L
L. 243 (1965).
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conflict). 17 It is also possible to assign prisoner of war status to persons
who would otherwise be subject to less favorable treatment.1 8 Persons
detained as suspects may later be shown to fall into one of these categories.
It can be seen by these standards that South Vietnam and the United
States have adopted broad definitions for qualifying prisoners of war which
are more liberal than provided in the Geneva Convention. Under the
policy set forth in MACV directives all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
troops are classified as prisoners of war even if they do not meet the
standards of the Geneva Convention. 9 In general, the rights of prisoners
of war are accorded to all captives who are under arms during the conduct
of military operations. 20 With respect to prisoners captured by the South
Vietnamese, the United States forces have been instructed to "encourage"
the observation of the Geneva Convention. 21
III. The Chieu Hoi Program
On 17 April, 1963 the Vietnamese Government initiated the Chieu Hoi
program. Chieu Hoi (pronounced "chew hoy") is translated literally as
"appeal to return," and those responding to the appeal are called Hoi
Chanh (pronounced "Hoy Chun") or returnees, 22 One of the principles
upon which the Chieu Hoi program was based was the belief that if the
Viet Cong had an alternative to a fight to the finish he would avail himself
of that alternative and freedom. 23 Thus, the rationale behind the program is
17MACV Dir. 381-46, Annex A. Compare examples cited at MACV Dir. 20-5, para.
5C.
" For a concise treatment of prisoners of war in Vietnam see U.S. Dep't of State
Publication 8275, Vietnam Information Notes No. 9, Prisoners of War (Aug. 1967).
19MACV Dir. 190-3, sets forth a policy for detainees of the Conventions. A former
Chief of the International Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters,
MACV, states: "Because of the nature of the enemy in Vietnam and the difficulty of fitting
him into the PW categories, PW status has been expanded to include captured VC who, if
only the letter of the Convention were being followed, would not be entitled to full protec-
tion .... In effect, then, a determination of PW can be based upon the detainee's status or
actions." Haight (Commander, USN), The Geneva Conventions in the Shadow of War, U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings (Sep. 1968).20International Review of the Red Cross, External Affairs: Vietnam, 188 (Apr. 1967).
21U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 31-73. ADVISOR HANDBOOK FOR COUN-
TER-INSURGENCY, para. 36a (1965).22Military Assistance Command Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support,
Saigon, The Chieu Hoi Program: Questions and Answers I (Mar. 1968) [hereafter cited as
Questions and Answers]: U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 550-55, AREA HANDBOOK
FOR SOUTH VIETNAM 493 (1967).
2"This program has converted many people from enemies to supporters of the govern-
ment, people who might otherwise have been simply prosecuted for their insurgency ac-
tion.... [T]his program offers the insurgent hope of a better life if he lays down his arms and
,returns to the fold.' " JAG School, U.S. Army, USAR Schools Course, Legal Aspects of
Internal Defense/Internal Development Operations 9 (Rev. 1968). See generally, for back-
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that an enemy military force can be weakened by creating opportunities for
defection. 24 This concept was partly based upon the experiences with
insurgencies in the Philippines and in Malaya. 25
The specific aims of the Chieu Hoi program may be listed as follows.
First, to induce military and civilian VC and members of the North Viet-
namese Army (PAVN) to come over to the side of the RVN. Second, to
convert as many VC and PAVN as possible into useful citizens through
fair treatment, reindoctrination, and training. Third, to weaken the Commu-
nist cause through the loss of military personnel and at the same time
strengthen the RVN by the addition of these individuals. Fourth, to cause
dissension and distrust among the members of the Communist military and
political agencies in South Vietnam.
The entire basic responsibility for the program belongs to the Govern-
ment of Vietnam (GVN).26 The United States provides financial and com-
modity support and advises on all phases of the program.2 7
In Vietnam the South Vietnamese Government created the ministry of
Chieu Hoi to administer the program. At the regional level are representa-
tives of the ministry who provide technical supervision over the program.
There is a Chieu Hoi service in every province and the chief of that service
supervises all Chieu Hoi activities in the province. The manager of the
provincial Chieu Hoi Center operates under his supervision. A three-man
ground information on the Chieu Hoi program, Foreign Service Institute, Vietnam Training
Center, The Chieu Hoi Program (16 Feb. 1968) [hereafter cited as Chieu Hoi program].24No attempt will be made to probe for motives or analyze factors which led up to the
decision to become Hoi Chanh. Both the Rand Corporation and Simulmatics Corporation
have been engaged in extensive analyses of defectors in an effort to understand the process
responsible for causing one first to become a guerrilla and then to reject this commitment by
outright defection. For the most recent study from the Rand Corporation see Kellen, Conver-
sations With NVA and VC Soldiers: A Study of Enemy Motivation and Morale, Rand
Corporation (Memo RM6131-ISA-ARPA) (Apr. 1970). From the Simulmatics Corporation
see 1-3 Simulmatics Corporation, Improving the Effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program
(Sept. 1967). For a U.S. Government study see Wofford, Hoi Chanh Group Motivation and
Possible Use of Group Dynamics as an Instrument of Government Reform (USAID/FE27 1)
(Sept. 1966).25Chieu Hoi Program 1; JAG School, U.S. Army, School Text, Legal Control of the
Populace in Subversive Warfare 330 n. 159 (1966). See also Tilman, The Non-Lessons of the
Malayan Emergency, MILITARY REVIEW 61 (Dec. 1966). Although in both instances the
political, military, and environmental elements were unique, some of the lessons learned are
relevant to the current Chieu Hoi program in South Vietnam. For a good general summary of
the Philippine experience see Valeriano & Bohannan, Counterguerrilla Operations: The
Philippine Experience (1962). For a comparison of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam
see Clutterbuck, THE LONG, LONG WAR (1966).26For an article on the results and other observations of the different operating levels and
techniques of the Chieu Hoi program see Brewer, Chieu Hoi: The Surrender Program in
Vietnam, AIR UNIVERSITY REV. 50 (Sep.-Oct. 1967).27Questions and answers 7.
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Chieu Hoi team, one of whom is the District Chieu Hoi Chief, is autho-
rized for each district.28 On the U.S. side the Civil Operations Revolution-
ary Development Support (CORDS) office is the agency tasked with the
Chieu Hoi effort.29
Once a soldier of the VC or PAVN rallies by turning himself over to the
GVN-U.S. side he is given a military intelligence de-briefing at the site of
his surrender.30 The new Hoi Chanh is then sent to one of the 52 Chieu
Hoi centers located throughout the country. Each man is questioned again
to determine if he is a bona fide Communist.3 1 Whether a particular in-
dividual should be classified as a Hoi Chanh depends upon the results of
these detailed interrogations, checking with existing records, or sometimes
identification by other Hoi Chanh. If it develops that a man did not in fact
support a military or policitcal activity of the VC, he is reclassified as a
refugee. The policy is to avoid any prisoner of war image for returnees.
When a Hoi Chanh does arrive at the Chieu Hoi Center he is registered,
fingerprinted, and photographed and he makes application for his identi-
fication card. While at the Center he attends military and political lectures
concerned with the way of life in Vietnam's noncommunist society. He is
reunited with his family whenever possible. Most of the centers have
vocational training projects in the agricultural and construction skills. Lit-
eracy courses are available.
Those electing to stay on at the center beyond the normal orientation
period, which is 45-60 days, may enroll in advanced vocational training,
such as automotive mechanics, tailoring and carpentry. When a Hoi Chanh
ultimately walks out of a Chieu Hoi Center, he has a standard identification
card which bears no indication that he has ever been a Viet Cong or Hoi
Chanh. Hoi Chanh can then become reabsorbed into the Vietnamese
society. Some Hoi Chanh volunteer to be scouts for GVN and U.S. forces.
Some are organized into armed propaganda teams which are designed to
induce defections by circulating among the families known to have mem-
bers in the VC, appearing at public rallies and telling of their experiences,
and disturbing propaganda materials32
28See, Foreign Service Institute, Vietnam Training Center, The Refugee Program in
Vietnam, Annexes D and F (Jun. 1968).
29CORDS, which is a part of MACV, is a joint military and civilian operation. The
MACV commander's chief deputy, serving with the personal rank of ambassador, is respon-
sible for the operations of CORDS. The first high ranking civilian taking this job was Robert
Komer. See his articles in ARMY MAGAZINE, Clear, Hold and Rebuild(May, Jun. 1970).
3
°Personal interview with members of the Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C., Nov.
1970.
3 1No distinction is made in the official Vietnamese proclamations on Chieu Hoi between
VC or NVA, there is only the one category, i.e., "Communists." The Policy of National
Reconciliation-Proclamation - 19 Apr. 1967.32Questions and Answers 5, 7, II.
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It is the ultimate aim of the Chieu Hoi program to return former enemies
to productive lives as ordinary citizens as soon as they are rehabilitated. It
is estimated that thirty percent of the returnees are serving in the armed
forces of the Government.33 This is understandable because a Hoi Chanh
feels safer surrounded by armed comrades than if he were to remain an
isolated target in civilian society vulnerable to Viet Cong assassination.
Another factor is that Hoi Chanh lose draft deferments six months after
their date of release from the Chieu Hoi Center.34
It is recognized that the South Vietnamese Government political situ-
ation has a direct bearing on the Chieu Hoi program. During a period of
political instability the returnee input rate drops drastically. So, military
pressure is a factor in bringing in the VC. At the same time military
operations probably provide a greater opportunity to defect.
Since the program was launched in 1963, approximately 144,000 Com-
munists have taken advantage of the Chieu Hoi amnesty program.35 Of this
number, 830 were North Vietnamese Army soldiers including 368 in 1969
alone.36 Overall, Chieu Hoi is apparently gaining in popularity3 7 as during
1969 a record total of 47,023 Communist military and civilian person-
nel-"158 percent increase over 1968's number"-changed over to the
government side.38
In May 1970, an unprecedented windfall did occur along another line.3 9
In that month 313 prisoners of war who had been captured on the battle-
field and were being held in several prisoner of war camps in South
33Chieu Hoi Program 5.34Delta Military Assistance Command Information Bulletin 384-69, para. 11 4 (15 Sep.
1969).35Embassy of Vietnam Information Series. The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam 5 (May
1970) [hereafter cited as Embassy Information Series]; for detailed statistics by month and
region since inception of the program see Questions and Answers 20; Chieu Hoi Program at
Appendix A.
36Embassy Information Series 14, See Questions and Answers 7; Chieu Hoi Program 3.370n 19 April 1967, after the Chieu Hoi program had been operating for a few years and
was considered a success the GVN announced the "Doan Ket" or National Reconciliation
policy. It was initiated to attract middle and upper ranks of the VC hierarchy by promising
them employment positions commensurate with their former position and ability if they
defect. Chieu Hoi Program 8; National Reconciliation Campaign Proclamation (Prime Min-
ister Nguyen Cao Ky, 19 Apr. 1970), quoted in Dep't of State Message, subject: Doan Ket,
No. 23757 (19 Apr. 1970).38Embassy Information Series 5. "One of the most dramatic illustrations of PSYOP's
psychological operations potential is the success of the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program,
aimed at convincing the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese army regulars to rally to the side of
the government .... Success of the Chieu Hoi program can be measured not only by the
numbers of those who come in, but by the invective aroused by counterpropaganda of the
enemy," Plassmeyer,PSYOPerators, ARMY DIGEST 8, 9 (Dec. 1970).
"gEmbassy of Vietnam Feature Service, Changing Allegiance- The Chieu Hoi Program
in Vietnam 29 (Mar. 1970).
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Vietnam petitioned the government to allow them to rally to the Republic's
cause as Hoi Chanh. Hoi Chanh status had been accorded some prisoners
of war in the past but this marked the first time that such a significant
number joined together to ultimately become fullfledged citizens of the
RVN.
IV. Repatriation and International Law
The first paragraph of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention provides:
"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities." The obligation to repatriate was made
unilateral so that its implementation would not be denied by the necessity
of obtaining the consent of both parties. 40 No express provision was made
for prisoners of war (PW) who did not desire repatriation.
The problem of involuntary repatriation was shown 4 1 during the Korean
armistice negotiations when thousands of North Koreans and Chinese held
by the United Nations Command expressed their desire to renounce their
right to be repatriated. 42 The position of the United Nations Command and
the United States that prisoners of war were not to be forcibly repatriated
prevailed. 43
It is useful to draw upon the Korean experience for lessons that might
have application to negotiations for the repatriation of prisoners of war in
Vietnam.
As of October 1970, 36,000 North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong
internees were in prisoner of war camps in South Vietnam44 compared with
169,000 Communist internees at the time of the Korean negotiations. 45 As
of October 1970, the U.S. believes that some 457 American military
personnel were being held as prisoners of war and an unknown number of
soldiers of the ARVN. This compares to 3,746 Americans, 8,321 person-
403 Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War 54 1-43 (1960).
41The American experience following 1945 was that some PW's of Italian and German
nationality imprisoned in this country desired to remain in this country rather than to be
repatriated. To the extent that there was litigation, the policy that every PW must be
repatriated and that none could remain in the U.S., at least one court supported this policy. In
reTerrito, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).42See Schapiro, The Repatriation of Deserters, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 310 (1952)
[hereafter cited as Schapiro] for a study of the practices of nations with respect to the
repatriation of defectors and deserters from the enemy.
43Mayda, The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law, 47, AM. J. INT'L L.
414, 427 (1953); Schapiro 323.44U.S. Dep't of State Publication 8556, East Asian and Pacific Series 197, U.S. Prison-
ers of War in Southeast Asia 2, 3 (Oct. 1970).
45Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front 141 (Dep't of Army, Office of the Chief of
Military History, 1966).
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nel of South Korea, and 1,377 personnel from the various contingents of
the United Nations Command who were in North Korea. In conclusion,
probably the biggest difference is that, contrary to Korea, in Vietnam there
is no unifying command. U.S. forces and the Vietnamese forces operate
jointly, but not under one senior commander.
As mentioned earlier the most difficult issue in the Korean armistice was
the fundamental disagreement on whether a prisoner of war had a choice to
be repatriated. The Communist side said that all prisoners of war must be
repatriated regardless of their desires.46 The United Nations Command
maintained, and eventually won, that he did have a choice and no prisoner
of war would be returned who indicated he resisted repatriation. 47
The United Nations Command maintained that the spirit of the Con-
vention to protect the rights of the individual prisoner of war would be
violated by forcible return. 48 In fact, customary international law had
always in the past permitted a government to grant asylum to PW's. 49 At
the end of World War 11 the leadership of the allied powers had been
concerned by the treatment returnees had received in their Communist
homelands. 50 The humanitarian aspect of the United Nations Command
position therefore had great appeal. 5 1 But, the psychological victory of
demonstrating that a substantial number of soldiers did not desire a return
to their homeland in a Communist society cannot be overlooked.
Notwithstanding the humanitarian appeal the United Nations Command
4 6For the conclusion that forcible repatriation would deprive prisoners of war of their
fundamental human rights (Art. 118), see Charmatz & Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War
and the 1949 Geneva Convention, 62 YALE L. J. 391 (1953). Also see Esgain & Solf, The
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: Its Principles,
Innovations and Deficiencies, 41 N.C. L. REV. 537, 589 et. seq. (1963).47See generally, Lundin, Repatriation of PW's: The Legal and Political Aspects, 39
A.B.A.J. 559 (Jul. 1953).
48See Acheson, The Prisoner Question and Peace in Korea, Dep't of State Bulletin
745-47 (Nov. 1952). Dean Acheson delivered a speech to the United Nations Political
Committee wherein he pointed out that the U.S.S.R. had accepted the principle of voluntary
repatriation in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and had offered what amounted to
voluntary repatriation to German soldiers.
49 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1962).5 0B. Shub, The Choice 36-47 (1950). This is an account of Russian prisoners repatriated
to the U.S.S.R.
511t should be noted in passing, however, that the United Nations Command position
was not universally convincing. Admiral C. Turner Joy, the senior delegate to the armistice,
stated that "the principle of voluntary repatriation was an arbitrary one, commanding no solid
support in the Geneva Conventions..." and that the Communist interpretation was a "cor-
rect literal interpretation of that covenant." Joy, How Communists Negotiate 150-5 1 (1955).
The problem with a literalist interpretation is that it assumes the words are unambiguous and
require no interpretation. But an international agreement must always be interpreted by men
of differing cultural backgrounds and the words given meaning from context. The defects in
the literalist mode of thinking is shown in McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter:
An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L. J. 258, 262-69 (1951).
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position has legal substance. As mentioned previously, Article 118 calls for
release and repatriation. 52 Forcible repatriation would be detention and
repatriation through conveyance of the prisoner of war under restraint to
the authorities of his country. President Eisenhower taking a long view of
the voluntary repatriation princple stated: "The armistice in Korea in-
augurated a new principle of freedom-that prisoners of war are entitled to
choose the side to which they will be released. In its impact upon history,
that one principle may weigh more than any battle of our time." 53
The Convention itself is designed for the "protection" of prisoners of
war. The text provides that prisoners of war must be protected against
violence or intimidation and humanely treated "at all times." 54 Their dig-
nity as human beings is not to be insulted.55 Repatriation as a part of the
Convention must be viewed in the light of these purposes. 56 The climate of
opinion following World War II was committed to humanitarian principles.
The 1949 Convention was an attempt to improve on the 1929 Con-
vention following the experience of World War 11.57 Public opinion in all
countries views with disapproval "the continued detention of prisoners of
war at a time when there was no longer any reasonable possibility that
hostilities might be resumed."'58 Certainly the humanitarian principles moti-
vating the improvement of conditions of prisoners of war would not be
served by releasing them from captivity in the capturing country, and
returning them to possible detention or death in their own country. 59
5 21n practice countries have given protection to prisoners of war who have not desired
repatriation. Flory, Prisoners of War 141- 47 (1942).53 Eisenhower, The American Concept of Education, Vital Speeches of the Day 516 (15
Jun. 1954).54Convention, Art. 13.55Convention, Art. 14.5 8McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60
YALE L. J. 258, 266 et seq. (1951).57The Convention is singularly but understandably inept in dealing with the repatriation
problem because the drafters were concerned with the release of prisoners replacing the old
custom of slavery at the end of hostilities. Repatriation was probably always thought to be
the desire of the prisoner concerned. It is somewhat sad when one realizes that the primary
purpose of the 1949 Convention was to eliminate "known ambiguities in the 1929 Convention
and more spelling out of matters which had previously been left to the humane discretion of
the signatories in 1929." Dillon, Genesis of 1949 Convention on Prisoners of War, 5 MIAMI
L. Q. 40, 45 (1950). For a comparison between the 1929 and 1949 Conventions see Gutte-
ridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 294 (1949). The 1949
Convention is appraised in Yingling & Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 393 (1952); Dillon, supra this note; and Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for
the Protection of War Victims, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (195 1).5 8 Oppenheim's International Law 613 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).59See generally, Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46
AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 431 (1952). In forming an opinion about the benignity of the Communist
state in North Vietnam it is useful to review some figures. In the 1954 Geneva agreements
there was a provision made for the movement of civilians from either side to the other who
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Perhaps the main argument to counter forcible repatriation is to examine
carefully the language used. The relevant phrase is "shall be released and
repatriated." Forcible repatriation would involve the opposite from release,
since it would be necessary to continue to detain the prisoner and to
convey him under some form of restraint to his own country.6 0 Thus, the
privilege against forced repatriation should be assured in view of the stand
taken by the U.S. in Korea subject only to the discretion of the Republic of
Vietnam in the granting of asylum. 6 1
V. Repatriation, Defection, and the Chieu Hoi Program
It would seem to be infinitely preferable for an enemy soldier to opt for
amnesty under the Chieu Hoi program than to surrender. 62 As a Hoi
Chanh the individual is integrated into society. As a prisoner he is still a
combatant 63 thus not only committed to an unyielding position, but also
prone to escape6 4 and other forms of resistance.6 5 "Surrender" marks the
uniqueness of the Chieu Hoi program. No identifiable body of international
law serves as a precedent for its judicial evaluation. Surrender is only
possible as a simultaneous mutual engagement of the two parties. The
Chieu Hoi program is something entirely different.
deemed their safety to be in jeopardy. The number going south exceeded that moving north by
a factor of ten. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 345 (1954). The author states the hegira
would have been multiplied seven-fold if refugees had been permitted to leave freely.60For a general discussion of this area with an interpretation consistent with the U.N.
position see Gutteridge, The Repatriation of Prisoners of War, 2 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 207
(1953).61Schapiro, 310-24. On granting asylum by the detaining power to prisoners of war who
do not wish to be repatriated see Baxter, Asylum to Prisoners of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
489 (1953).62Material benefits probably have an equal attraction with amnesty in enticing returnees
to the GVN's side. The material benefits include rewards, housing, personal clothing and
items, medical treatment, job assistance, and monetary grants and allowance. Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam, JUSPAO Leaflet and Poster Catalogue, SP-2079, SP-2082
(Change No. 1, 19 Nov. 1967).63Seen in this vein a prisoner's captivity can be conceived in two ways, first, as the
termination of combat with a total quarantine for the duration of the war, and second, as the
termination of one sort of combat and its replacement by another sort. See Prugh, Prisoners of
War: The P.O.W. Battleground, 60 DICK. L. REV. 123, 138 (1956).64The Geneva Convention recognizes that prisoners will not be passive and treats at
considerable length escapes. Articles 42, 91-93. See also Greenspan, The Modern Law of
Land Warfare 135- 37 (1959).
6Cf. Art. 82 Convention, which bars physical resistance. It is interesting to note what
United States policy would be in this regard. Article III, Code of Conduct (Executive Order
10631, 1955) provides that American soldiers will "continue to resist by all means available."
It was argued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense at the time the Code of Conduct was
adopted that physical resistance was not required, but only mental resistance to political
indoctrination of prisoners. C. Burgess, Prisoners of War, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 677
(1956). Compare Prugh, The Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
678,690 (1956).
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 4
648 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
The Chieu Hoi program appeals to those who are serving the
VC/PAVN to return or to make their allegiance to the GVN. The Chieu
Hoi program secures its participants solely by a voluntary act done unilat-
erally. It is not a surrender program. It does not call on the enemy to
surrender to save their lives. This is more than a semantic point, both to
those who may return and to those who actually administer the program.
This offering of amnesty for the positive action of returning or changing to
rightful allegiance is a type of benevolence.
Research failed to disclose the categories of which the Hoi Chanh were
comprised; that is, whether they were found during a search and clear
operation, voluntarily surrendered, or had their weapons taken away for-
cibly or under threat of immediate capture or being shot. The only identi-
fiable category of Hoi Chanh were those who had previously been clas-
sified and interned as prisoners of war. It is with this category that a legal
difficulty is encountered regarding their ultimate utilization after they enter
the Chieu Hoi program.
The enemy soldier, either VC or PAVN, who voluntarily places himself
in the custody of GVN/US forces to become a Hoi Chanh is exempt from
PW status. In the case of South Vietnamese (VC) they are returning to
rightful allegiance and in the case of North Vietnamese (PAVN) they are
voluntarily terminating allegiance to the forces of their country. Their
utilization as scouts or soldiers in the ARVN would not violate the Geneva
Convention or be contrary to the spirit of the humanitarian principles
contained therein. It is after the enemy soldier is already in a PW camp and
later wants to become a Hoi Chanh that legal difficulty arises. Such person-
nel clearly "fall into the power" of the GVN/US forces within the meaning
of Article 4 of the Convention. It might be argued by North Vietnam that
to allow them to renounce such status would violate the provisions of
Article 7.
Article 7 states: "Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Con-
vention .... -66 Practically speaking, this issue would only seem to arise
regarding utilization as scouts or soldiers. Article 50 enumerates the pre-
scribed classes or work that a PW may perform. 7 Generally, it indicates
that any activity that is of a military character or purpose is prohibited.
Therefore, any possible contention raised by North Vietnam can be
66Convention, Art. 7.67Apparently an argument can be made that prisoners of war can volunteer for prohibited
work notwithstanding Article 7 of the Convention. See Baldwin, A New Look at the Law of
War: Limited War and Field Manual 27-10, 4 MIL. L. REv. 1, 7, n.26 (1959).
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countered by the GVN's not accepting the internees' offers of voluntary
services to fight. The possibility that the erstwhile PW's can thereby
escape the draft and reap the benefit of South Vietnamese citizenship may
pose practical difficulties. However, in the absence of mass enemy defec-
tions, this is the price to be paid for obviating any possible propaganda
concerning the utilization of PW's. At the present time this does not pose a
major problem because of the small number that have been given prisoner
of war status and later entered the Chieu Hoi program.
This same possible -argument, if it relates to the vast majority of Hoi
Chanh, is easily laid to rest by the fact that the Hoi Chanh are not
prisoners of war since they rallied voluntarily. Thus, they are not renounc-
ing PW treatment when they are transferred to Chieu Hoi centers. 68 The
same reasoning would also apply to counter any possible argument that the
Chieu Hoi program is a parole in violation of the Geneva Convention.6 9
VI. Conclusions
The basic question therefore remains: What consequences will result
from the current practice of total asylum and the assurance of no forcible
repatriation for all classes of enemy persons? We have seen as a result of
the experience in Korea that forcible repatriation will not be an issue for
the United States in South Vietnam. The American State Department has
said:
[T]he question of repatriation does not arise in the case of South Vietnamese
who enter the Chieu Hoi program. It could enter in the case of North
Vietnamese who become Hoi Chanh and later were repatriated, but thus far a
relatively small number of North Vietnamese have rallied under the Chieu
Hoi program, and none of these have been repatriated to the North .... 70
Furthermore, if soldiers of the PAVN did not desire to be returned to
North Vietnam they would evidently request status as Hoi Chanh.
6 8See e.g., MACV Dir. 381-50, at para. 5 f: "Returnees will not be transferred along or
in the same manner as PW's, or treated in such a manner that they, or anyone else, might
mistake them for prisoners."6 9The Convention states that any parole agreement or arrangement contrary to the laws
or regulations of the prisoner's country is invalid. Convention, Art. 2 1. Army Field Manual
27-10, para. 187, states U.S. policy which permits temporary parole in only very limited
circumstances. For a discussion of the contemporary law on parole agreements see Green-
span, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 108- 10 (1959). It is somewhat interesting to explore
American policy in this regard. The Code of Conduct explicitly declares that U.S. prisoners
must not give their parole to their captors. Code of Conduct, Art. IV, Executive Order 10631
(1955). Manes, Barbed Wire Command, 10 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1960).71Letter from Department of State to author, 2 Nov. 1970. On the point that some
POW's have been repatriated to North Vietnam, see also Embassy of Vietnam (Washington,
D.C.) Publication, Vietnam Bulletin, Prisoner of the Viet Cong 4 (19 Oct. 1970).
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The search for the answer is clouded by the fact that there is no known
consensus as to what the final outcome in Vietnam will be. It is assumed
nonetheless that three principal factors will determine the outcome of the
present Chieu Hoi policy: North Vietnamese and Viet Cong reaction to its
implementation; the stability of the Government of South Vietnam; and the
ability of the South Vietnamese Government to handle the returnees ade-
quately and cope with the problem of a large influx of persons into their
society at a time when America is trying to disengage itself by Vietnam-
ization.
The GVN Chieu Hoi program is inextricably bound up with economic
and sociological considerations, immigration policies, the problem of ex-
penses in relocation, and nationalism. It cannot stand alone and apart from
the full diverse range of efforts being pursued in an attempt to put down a
guerrilla war. In short, the Chieu Hoi program is but one important facet of
the greater complex operation. Its underlying importance is in its providing
a clear-cut alternative to continued hostilities.
In this latter regard a discussion of international law is necessary only
insofar as it is evident that the principles and practices of the Chieu Hoi
program are in accord with the Geneva Convention, and basically under-
stood humanitarian principles. Support for the GVN's policy depends a
great deal upon the backing of the Vietnamese people and their conception
of what is right and wrong. The policy of offering political amnesty to
antagonists has become a part of the apparatus of counterinsurgency, that
is, a necessary program in response to internal Communist insurrection. If
there is to be any cooling of the dissidence at large in a country the offer
must be made.
On practical grounds it is not good for the U.S. to become overly
involved with the Chieu Hoi program. The principal burden must fall on
the Vietnamese themselves. In the event there is ever a cessation of
hostilities the Vietnamese must learn how to use their reservoir of man-
power and material resources. "If the South is to rediscover its own
revolutionary traditions, and to preserve and modify them in the relation to
the Communist North, it must be as unmolested and unsupervised as
possible .... ,,71
71Shaplen, Vietnam: Crisis of Indecision, 46 Foreign Affairs 95, 108 (Oct. 1967); see
Westerman & McHugh, Reaching for the Rule of Law in South Vietnam, 53 A.B.A.J. 159,
164 (Feb. 1967) ("Men do not like to have their destinies distantly controlled, even when it is
to their own benefit"). "America cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all
the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the
world." President Nixon's State of the World Message, 1970, in 76 (No. 24) Newsweek 29
(14 Dec. 1970).
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We should, however, support the program and the policy it represents.
As long as the present Chieu Hoi policy continues to work it is appropriate
that the United States of America founded by immigrants, and dedicated to
the proposition that all men are created equal, should put its influence
behind a policy of offering freedom and a new life to those persons desiring
it.
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